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CHARTER SCHOOLS UNDER THE NCLB:
CHOICE AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY
JOSEPH 0. OLUWOLE AND PRESTON C. GREEN, III1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB")
"is to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant
opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a
minimum,
proficiency
on
challenging
state
academic
achievement standards and state academic assessments." 2 One of
the ways the NCLB hopes to achieve this purpose is to close the
achievement gaps between minority and non-minority students
by giving those students in failing schools options to transfer to
schools where they can receive a high-quality education. 3 Charter
schools are one such option for students seeking to transfer from
low-performing schools. 4
Supporters of charter schools assert that charter schools will
address the "soft bigotry of low expectations" by providing
5
students with equal educational opportunity through choice.
1 Joseph 0. Oluwole, J.D., Ph.D., is an attorney-at-law and an Assistant Professor of
Education Law in the Department of Counseling, Human Development and Educational
Leadership at Montclair State University, Montclair, New Jersey. Preston C. Green, III,
J.D., Ed.D., Associate Professor of Law at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson
School of Law and Department of Education Policy Studies.
2 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
3 Id. at § (3), (4) (differentiating also between "disadvanted" and "advantaged"
students).
4 See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE,
DRAFT, E-1 (2004), available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/schoolchoiceguid.pdf.
(stating that except for specified situations, "students must be given the option to transfer
to other public schools, which may be charter schools").
5 See Abigail, Aikens, Being Choosy: An Analysis of Public School Choice Under No
Child Left Behind, 108 W. VA L. REV. 233, 234-35 (2005) (noting school choice advocates
hope giving students opportunities to transfer to higher performing schools will
incentivize underachieving schools to match high performing schools' scores, but those
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The choice model, however, is a departure from previous
paradigms to achieve equal educational opportunity. 6 The other
paradigms are desegregation and school finance. 7 State
legislatures are somewhat leery about the segregative effects of
charter schools. 8 In light of this, a number of states have enacted
statutes with the aim of achieving and maintaining racial
balance in charter schools. 9
The goal of this paper is to discuss charter schools and equal
educational opportunity, particularly under the paradigm of
choice. The first section of this paper provides an overview of the
three major paradigms for educational equality: desegregation;
school finance; and choice. This section will also explain how
charter schools fit into the choice paradigm and will discuss how
the NCLB deals with charter schools.
The second section
discusses policy issues.
This section presents the conflict
between charter schools and desegregation decrees. The paper
then concludes asking the question whether charter schools
actually improve educational performance.

goals have not yet been met due to implementation difficulties and lack of meaningful
transfer options).
6 See Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV.
563, 615-16 (2001) (noting differences between charter schools and previously used
method, desegregation, and that in order to ensure that charter schools will not be
segregated, states have explicitly required charter schools to comply with school
desegregation orders or not interfere with desegregation process); see also Michael Heise,
Equal Educational Opportunity by the Numbers: The Warren Court's Empirical Legacy,
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1321, 1324, 1329, 1331 (2002) (distinguishing between
desegregation, school finance, school choice, and progression of litigation resulting from
each).
7 See Heise, supra note 6, at 1321, 1324, 1329, 1331 (discussing desegregation, school
finance, and school choice as major efforts seeking to structurally enhance educational
opportunity, and litigation that has ensued).
8 See Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School Statutes
That Blur the Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349, 350-51 (2003)
(adding "some worry that charter schools as a form of school choice will damage the
democratic principles on which public education is based and may even allow parents
effectively to self-segregate.").
9 See Suhrid S. Gajendragadkar, The Constitutionalityof Racial Balancing in Charter
Schools, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 144, 145 (2006) (noting troubling reality that charter schools
suffer greater segregation than public schools, and eleven states have enacted racial
balancing provisions in their statutes authorizing charter schools to counterbalance that
trend).
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I. EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY PARADIGMS
The three paradigms to achieve equal educational opportunity
This section
are desegregation, school finance, and choice.
presents an overview of each of these paradigms.
A. DesegregationParadigm
In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,O the

United States Supreme Court held that the segregation of public
schools was unconstitutional, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution." Overturning Plessy v. Ferguson,12 the Court held
the "separate but equal" doctrine unconstitutional.13 The Court
found that this doctrine would effectively psychologically damage
black students as it creates in them "feeling[s] of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."14
A year later, in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas,15 the Supreme Court created what became known as the
era of "all deliberate speed."16 Brown H set out guidelines, with
no deadlines or timelines, for eliminating de jure desegregation;
instead, the Court held that public schools should desegregate
"with all deliberate speed."17 De jure segregation is segregation
that is government-sanctioned; it is driven by intentional acts of
the government.' 8 This is distinguishable from de facto
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11 Id. at 495 (holding separate educational facilities are inherently unequal and that
plaintiffs were deprived of equal protection of laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
12 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
14 Id. at 494.
15 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kansas, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter brown
Ill.
16 See Preston Cary Green, Can State ConstitutionalProvisions Eliminate De Facto
Segregation in the Public Schools?, 68 J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 138, 140 (1999) (labeling era
immediately following Brown I).
17 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298-301(remanding to local courts for determination of
what relief should be granted while also providing guidance for their analysis and stating
that desegregation should be implemented "with all deliberate speed"); Green, supra note
16, at 140 (describing how Court provided guidelines for ending de jure segregation,
choosing to require implementation with "all deliberate speed" rather than setting specific
timetables).
18 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973) (defining de jure segregation as
"current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action.").
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segregation; de facto segregation is segregation that results from
factors other than intentional acts by the government.19
Desegregation advocates welcomed the Supreme Court's
decisions in Brown I and Brown II, with optimism that educating
black children in white schools would provide black students
with improved educational opportunities. 2 0 Advocates of
2
desegregation policies have been greatly disappointed, however. 1
Soon after the Brown decisions, a number of states and southern
school districts employed a number of strategies to prevent the
success of school desegregation policies; this heralded the era of
"massive resistance." 2 2 Federal troops were enlisted to confront
sprouting "threats of violence and intimidation by state
officials." 23 To effectively impede desegregation, Arkansas
amended its constitution to make the Brown decisions
unconstitutional. 24 Ten years after the "all deliberate speed"
standard, 97.8% of black students in eleven southern states were
still in segregated schools. 2 5
In Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,26
the Supreme Court declared the "[all] deliberate speed" standard
constitutionally defective, stating that "[t]he time for mere
19 See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) (citing Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-2 (1971)) (distinguishing between de jure
segregation and segregation resulting from "other demographic factors," and declaring
that school districts have no duty to remedy the latter); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208-09
("differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation...
is purpose or intent to segregate.").
20 See Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum., 101 YALE L.J. 1285,
1288 (1992) (explaining that by ending state-approved segregation in public schools,
Supreme Court assumed "[b]lack schoolchildren would no longer be stigmatized by
attending separate schools and would instead receive better educational opportunities in
racially integrated school settings.").
21 See id. at 1286 (stating, "[slince Brown, numerous studies have shown that while
some black children benefit from attending school with white children, others lose
confidence and actually perform more poorly because of discriminatory tracking programs
and teachers' negative attitudes toward black children.").
22 See Robin D. Barnes, Group Conflict and the Constitution: Race, Sexuality, and
Religion: Black America and School Choice: Chartinga New Course, 106 YALE L.J. 2375,
2382 (1997) (describing several reactionary measures employed by various southern
school districts).
23 Id.
24 See id. (explaining post-Brown Arkansas legislation relieved white school children
from compulsory school attendance if they were enrolled in racially mixed schools); see
also Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33, 35 (8th Cir. 1958) (stating Arkansas adopted
Amendment 44 to its constitution, which commanded General Assembly to oppose Brown
decision).
25 See Barnes, supra note 22, at 2382 n.52 (citing U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights,
Twenty Years After Brown: Equality of EducationalOpportunity 46 (1975)).
26 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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deliberate speed had run out."27 Griffin paved the way for a
series of Supreme Court decisions aimed at speeding up the end
29
of de jure desegregation. 28 This was the era of federal activism.
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,30 was one
such Supreme Court decision. In that case, New Kent County
school system had two public schools, one for white students and
the other for black students. 3 1 The county's freedom-of-choice
plan provided that students could attend either school,
irrespective of race. 32 However, no white student ever chose to
attend the black school. 3 3 The Court held that freedom-of-choice
plans should not be used if alternative means could be used to
hasten desegregation. 3 4 The Court also laid out six factors,
known as the Green factors, as a guide to determining if a school
district has attained unitary status or desegregated. 3 5 The six
Green factors are: student assignments; faculty assignments;
transportation; facilities; student activities; and education
quality. 3 6 Desegregation decrees led to white flight from city
schools, and suburban school districts became almost 100%
white. 3 7
Further compounding the disappointment of advocates of
desegregation was the dawning of the era of federal restriction
and withdrawal. 3 8 In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver,
Colorado,3 9 the Supreme Court held that federal courts could not
grant desegregation remedies for de facto segregation. 4 0 Then in
27 Id. at 234. (internal quotes omitted).
28 See Green, supra note 16, at 140 (stating "Supreme Court issued several rulings to
hasten the eradication of de jure school segregation.").
29 See id. (referring to that time as "[t]he era of federal activism").
30 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
31 See id. at 432.
32 Id. at 433.
33 Id. at 441.
34 Id. at 440.
35 Id. at 435.
36 See Green, 391 U.S. at 437 (noting review of these factors as necessary in
determining whether a school district had truly "effectuate[d] a transition to a racially
nondiscriminatory school system.").
37 See Barnes, supra note 22, at 2383 (finding racial isolation to have increased
resulting from decreases in number of white students in urban school districts).
38 See Green, supra note 16, at 141 (suggesting Supreme Court's distinction between
de facto and de jure segregation to have allowed school districts to avoid desegregating).
39 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
40 See id. at 203 (holding that there must be state-imposed segregation in order for
federal court to grant desegregation remedy) (emphasis added).
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Milliken v. Bradley,4 1 the Supreme Court prohibited the
inclusion of suburban school districts in metropolitan
desegregation remedies, where there was no proof that the
suburban school districts had committed de jure desegregation.4 2
In Milliken, the federal district court's desegregation decree
included fifty-three of the eighty-five suburban school districts
made up of mostly white students in a decree desegregating a
metropolitan area. 4 3 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
in cases of single-district de jure school desegregation,
multidistrict remedies cannot be imposed unless those other
districts included in the remedy have engaged in de jure
desegregation, a difficult standard to prove. 44
Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,45 continued
the withdrawal of federal courts from school desegregation. In
that case, the Supreme Court held that if demographic changes
or residential patterns reflecting choice are the cause of
segregation, federal district courts can terminate desegregation
decrees, effectively ensuring the school district's return to onerace schools. 4 6 The Supreme Court also stated that desegregation
decrees are not to continue in perpetuity, adding that federal
courts cannot resume jurisdiction where a school district has
been released from a desegregation decree.4 7 The era of federal
restriction and withdrawal continued in Freeman v. Pitts.48 In
that case, the Supreme Court held that federal district courts
could gradually withdraw from overseeing a desegregation
decree, even before the school district has fully complied with the
decree. 49 In Freeman, the DeKalb County school system had
attained unitary status on a number of the Green factors, but not
41 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
42 Id. at 745.
43 Id. at 733.
44 Id. at 752-53.

45 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
46 Id. at 250; see Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of the Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 8 F.3d 1501,
1507 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding good faith compliance with desegregation decree and
determination whether vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to extent
practicable as relevant inquiries when termination was at issue).
47 See generally Dowell, 8 F.3d 1501.
48 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
49 Id. at 490 (holding that "in the course of supervising desegregation plans, federal
courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and control of school districts in
incremental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in every area of school
operations.").
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with respect to faculty assignments and resource allocation. 50
The Court held that federal district courts need not wait until a
school district has attained unitary status on all six of the Green
factors before releasing judicial oversight of the school district.51
In addition, the Court held that a school district that has
remedied de jure segregation is under no obligation to remedy
segregation caused by demographic changes, since de facto
52
segregation is without constitutional import.
In Missouri v. Jenkins,53 the Supreme Court struck down a
desegregation remedy that included suburban school districts,
reaffirming its holding in Milliken.54 The Court emphasized that
the goal of desegregation was to remedy de jure discrimination,
not to achieve greater desegregation where the cause of the
segregation was not de jure desegregation. 5 5 David Armor 56 and
Robin Barnes 57 claim that desegregation policies have negatively
impacted the academic achievement and self-esteem of black
students. However, these critiques fail to consider a benefit to
desegregation: improvement of the "quality of education for all
students by providing them with the opportunity to learn how to
better relate to one another."58 Despite any benefits
desegregation has produced, "public education since Brown
continues along separate and unequal lines." 5 9
50 Id. at 481-84 (stating some reasons why DeKalb County school system had not
reached unitary status with regard to faculty assignments and resource allocation).
51 Id. at 471 (holding that "district court need not retain active control over ever
aspect of school administration until a school district has demonstrated unitary status in
all facets of its system.").
52 Id. at 494 (arguing that once racial imbalance caused by de jure violation has been
fixed, school districts no longer have duties to fix any imbalance which is brought about
by demographic factors).
53 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995).
54 Id. at 94 (stating that nothing in Milliken, "suggests that the District Court in that
case could have circumvented the limits on its remedial authority by requiring the State
of Michigan, a constitutional violator, to implement a magnet program designed to
achieve the same interdistrict transfer of students that we held was beyond its remedial
authority.").
55 Id. at 90 (quoting "proper response to an intradistrict violation is an intradistrict
remedy that serves to eliminate the racial identity of the schools within the affected
school district by eliminating, as far as practicable, the vestiges of de jure segregation in
all facets of their operations.") (internal citations omitted).
56 See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 101
(Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (finding school desegregation has adverse impact on black
students).
57 See Barnes, supra note 22, at 2386 (noting "devastating impact on AfricanAmerican children" who are subject to segregation).
58 See Green, supra note 15, at 143 (critiquing Armor's suggestions).
59 See Barnes, supra note 21, at 2397.
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B. School Finance Paradigm
School finance litigation is one of the paradigms civil rights
advocates have employed over the years in an effort to ensure
equal educational opportunities.60 The goal is to increase funding
for the education of minority students and thus, improve their
academic performance.
The earliest framework for equalizing state aid allocations to
school districts was the foundation aid program. 6 1 This program
sought to allocate state aid so as to ensure that any district
levying a mandatory minimum local property tax would attain a
foundation level of spending. 62 The combination of a mandatory
minimum tax rate and the foundation level of spending, known
as "primary policy levers" aim "to (a) increase minimum
adequacy levels of spending in the poorest districts, (b) improve
overall horizontal equity by raising that floor, and (c) reduce the
extent that schooling resources are associated with local wealth
(fiscal neutrality)" 63 With time, states increasingly made
adjustments in foundation formulas so as to guarantee funding
for the operation of public schools. 64 Unlike primary policy levers
which are designed to improve fiscal neutrality, horizontal
equity, or minimum adequacy level across schools, these cost
adjustments, known as "secondary policy levers" are designed to
adjust aid formulas so that aid allocations are more adequate,

60 See Bruce D. Baker & Preston C. Green, Tricks of the Trade: State Legislative
Actions in School Finance Policy That Perpetuate Racial Disparities in the Post-Brown
Era, 111 AM. J. EDUC. 372, 406 (2005) (concluding school finance litigation has been used
since 1950's to ensure equal educational opportunities); see also Brian P. Marron,
Promoting Racial Equality Through Equal Educational Opportunity: The Case for
Progressive School-Choice, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 53, 67 (2002) (noting school finance
suits have been brought in over forty states).
61 See Baker & Green, supra note 60, at 373 (crediting George Strayer and Robert
Haig as presenting program); see also Hinkley A. Jones-Sanpei, Comment and Note:
Roosevelt v. Bishop: Balancing Local Interests with State Equity Interests in School
Financing,1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 223, 226 (1998) (stating foundation aid programs are
just first of many formulas used by states to finance elementary and secondary
education).
62 See Jones-Sanpei, supra note 61, at 226 (explaining, "[t[his method guarantees a
certain tax base for each district in the state, which uses state grants to 'match' the funds
supplied through local taxes, thus reducing the price of education to the school districts.").
63 See Baker & Green, supra note 60, at 374.
64 See id. at 374 (illustrating common practice of different levels of foundation aid for
elementary versus high schools).
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thus promoting vertical equity, which in simple terms, means the
"unequal treatment of unequals." 6 5
School finance litigation has gone through three waves. In
arguing for increased horizontal equity and fiscal neutrality, in
the first wave, civil rights advocates relied on the Equal
Protection Clause. However, in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,66 the United States Supreme Court
foreclosed arguments that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
funding disparities between wealthy and poor scho6l districts. 67
In the second wave, the civil rights advocates relied more on
state equal protection clauses in arguing that school funding
disparities were unconstitutional. 68 These efforts have been
mostly unsuccessful however, as state courts have relied on the
Supreme Court's analysis in Rodriguez in finding funding
disparities constitutional. 6 9
During the first and second waves of school finance litigation to
increase equal educational opportunity, state legislatures felt
pressured to search for "secondary policy levers" that would
ensure that funding was retained for wealthier school districts. 7 0
Then, the third wave came when civil rights advocates relied on
arguments that the state has failed to provide property-poor
school districts with an adequate education guaranteed in the
state's education clause. 7 1 This third wave was a shift in
emphasis from equity to adequacy and has increased the focus of
courts and legislatures on secondary policy levers. 72 The
publication of A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational
Reform, 73 as well as the decision of the Kentucky high court in
65 See id. at 374 (observing "secondary policy levers" might also be used to consolidate
funding in wealthier districts).
66 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
67 Id. at 6; see also Green, supra note 15, at 139 (discussing Rodriguez's findings).
68 See Green, supra note 15, at 139 (noting that any state measure must not violate
the Equal Protection Clause).
69 See Marron, supra note 60, at 67 (finding that most states upheld these funding
systems, though seven states overturned).
70 See Baker & Green, supra note 60, at 374 (reviewing different "policy levers" used
to undo inequities).
71 See Marron, supra note 60, at 67 (declaring that "current wave has focused on the
specific right to an education provided in 49 state constitutions.").
72 See Baker & Green, supra note 60, at 375 (writing that shift in emphasis from
equity to adequacy has come with focus on costs and cost variations).
73 A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform: A Report to the Nation
and the Secretary of Education (Nat'l Comm'n on Excellence in Educ. Apr. 1983),
availableat http://www.goalline.org/Goal%20Line/NatAtRisk.html.
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Rose v. Council for Better Education,74 effectively ensured that
educational adequacy came to be defined as "the opportunity to
achieve targeted educational outcomes." 7 5 In other words,
educational adequacy was increasingly seen as funding to
achieve vertical equity - the unequal treatment of equals rather than horizontal equity -different school districts receive
the same amount of funding. 76
Christopher Adolph77 and Kevin Carey 7S report that funding
disparities persist between minority and nonminority school
districts. 79 After Brown I and Brown II, state legislatures might
have modified their aid policies in order to continue funding
disparities along racial lines, through racially-neutral means.8 0
During the Progressive Era (1890-1910), states gave county
school boards absolute discretion in the disbursement of state aid
distributed to the counties.8 1 The county school boards used this
discretion to perpetuate funding disparities between black and
white school districts.8 2 Harlan8 3 points out that even though the
74 790 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1989).
75 See Baker & Green, supra note 60, at 375 (discussing impact of decisions including
Rose v. Council for Better Education).
76 The shift from equity to adequacy may require an evaluation to fund schools in
greater need rather than providing uniform funds to every school. See id. at 375.
77 Christopher Adolph, How Parties Distribute School Finance by Income and Race
(2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/cadolph/homepage/AdolphPF.pdf.
78 Kevin Carey, Low-Income and Minority Students Still Receive Fewer Dollars in
Many States, THE FUNDING GAP 2003 (The Educ. Trust Inst., Washington, D.C.) available
at http://www2.edtrust.org/NRlrdonlyres/EEOO4COA-D7B8-4OA6-8A03-1F26B8228502/0/
funding2003.pdf.
79 See Baker & Green, supra note 60, at 375 (citing both Carey and Adolph's work
regarding funding disparity between white and minority schools).
80 Legislatures enacted policies that technically complied with the Supreme Court,
but still produced inequitable disparities. For example, the Kansas legislature issued
funds based on city population which had the effect of providing disparate funds. See id.
at 386.
81 County school boards were given complete discretion to disburse funds to school
districts. This discretion often led to increased racial disparities. See id. at 376.
82 County school boards used their discretion to create inequitable funding. Often,
members of the school boards consisted of white trustees acting "for the best interests of
the school district." See id. at 376. The discretion given to school boards to disburse funds
created inequitable results in many of the Southern states such as Georgia. For example,
in Georgia a black student received one-fourth the funds of a white student. See LOUIS R.
HARLAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: PUBLIC SCHOOL CAMPAIGNS AND RACISM IN THE
SOUTHERN SEABOARD STATES 1901-1915 5, 12-17 (1958). School boards that sat in

jurisdictions with greater numbers of black students received more funds which they
inequitably used for the benefit of white students. See ROBERT A. MARCO,
DISENFRANCHISEMENT, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND THE ECONOMICS OF SEGREGATED SCHOOLS
IN THE UNITED STATES SOUTH, 1890-1910 71-75 (Stuart Bruchey ed., Garland Publishing
1985).
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discretion of white trustees responsible for the distribution of
funds to counties with a majority of black students was not colorblind, an 1896 South Carolina law gave them great discretion in
the allocation of funds.8 4
Legislatures in some states that once sanctioned de jure
segregation continue to maintain policies that effectively ensure
racial funding disparities.8 5 Baker and Green86 report that in
Maine and New Hampshire, the greater the minority population
of a school district, the less revenue that district is likely to
receive per student.8 7 Even though New Hampshire's black
population is only 1% and its total minority population 4%, a
school district's minority population in proportion to the state's
minority population accounts for more than half of the variance
in district revenues among school districts. 8 8 In New York, a
school district's minority population accounts for 64% of the
variance among school districts in state and local revenues per
student; in Kansas, minority status of the school district accounts
for 18% of the variance. 89 In Kansas, "racial funding disparities
are the result of organizational and cost adjustments that are
based on district size, which had the effect of underfunding those
districts that had been subject to de jure segregation." 9 0 Among
the reasons racial funding disparities have persisted is the fact
that until recently, there were no real attempts to employ a
racial perspective to explicitly address funding disparities. 9 1 This
83 HARLAN, supranote 81, at 174-75.
84 See id. at 174-75 (outlining how 1896 South Carolina gave considerable latitude to
white district trustees of predominantly black counties, whose judgment was "not colorblind").
85 See Baker & Green, supra note 60, at 397 (analyzing racial funding disparities in
two formerly de jure states - Alabama and Kansas).
86 Id.
87 See id. at 380-81 (referring to very large negative relationships between minority
population and district revenues per pupil in Maine and New Hampshire).
88 See id. at 381 (noting that in New Hampshire, district minority share explains
greater than half variance in district revenues even while New Hampshire's population is
only 4% minority and 1% black).
89 See id. at 381 (stating that in New York, minority status explains 64% of variance
in revenues per pupil and in Kansas, minority percentage of district explains 18% of
variance per pupil).
90 Id. at 406.
91 Baker and Green's premise is that legislatures are using proxies for race that
create funding disparities for schools in de jure segregated states. Since it seems a racial
perspective is being employed in formulating these "creatively developed policies," it
would only make sense to employ a racial perspective to ameliorate the problems created
by these funding policies. See Baker & Green, supra note 60, at 373.
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failure might have contributed to states and school districts alike
cunningly codifying racial disparities in race-neutral policies. 92
C. School Choice Paradigm
One of the goals of the school choice paradigm, in ensuring
equal educational opportunity, is to counter the "monopoly"
traditional public schools have over minorities by making
educational choices available to minorities. Such educational
choices include vouchers, intradistrict transfer choice, and
charter schools. This section focuses on charter schools.
The 1983 publication of A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for
Educational Reform, warning the nation of the dire state of the
public school system and the resulting grave threats to the
nation's future sparked a number of reform efforts directed at
reforming the nation's education system. 9 3 Charter schools were
one such reform. Ray Budde 9 4 introduced the concept of charter
schools in his book Education by Charter: Restructuring School
Districts. Former president of the American Federation of
Teachers, Albert Shanker, catapulted the charter school concept
into the national mindset in his weekly New York Times
column. 9 5 In 1991, Minnesota passed the first charter school law
in the nation. 96 Over the next twelve years, in all, forty states,
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia enacted charter school
laws.

97

92 See generally Baker & Green, supra note 60.
93 The National Commission on Excellence in Education was formed by the Secretary
of Education T.H. Bell on August 26, 1981 to examine the quality of education in the
United States. See generallyA Nation at Risk, supra note 72.
94 See generally RAY BUDDE, EDUCATION BY CHARTER: RESTRUCTURING SCHOOL
DISTRICTS. KEY TO LONG-TERM CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION
(1988).
95 See, e.g., Albert Shanker. Where We Stand, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1988, at E7
(representing precedent setting articles bringing forth changes in American education).
96 See PRESTON C. GREEN & JULIE F. MEAD, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE LAW:
ESTABLISHING NEW LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 1 (2004); Jonathan P. Krisbergh, Comment,
Marginalizing Organized Educators: The Effect of School Choice and 'No Child Left
Behind' on Teacher Unions, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1025, 1037 (2006) (stating
Minnesota charter school law started charter school movement).
97 See Kathryn Kraft, Comment, Cyber Charter Schools-An Analysis of Their
Legality, 56 SMU L. REV. 2327, 2327 (2003) (commenting in 2003 that forty states permit
charter schools).
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Charter schools are governed by state law; therefore, the
specifics of charter schools vary from state to state. 9 8 State
statutes dictate persons or entities eligible to start a charter
school and the duration of the charter. 9 9 Such persons or entities
have to seek a charter from a chartering authority. 100 Most states
grant chartering authority to state educational agencies and local
school districts.101 Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio and Wisconsin grant universities
and colleges chartering authorities.10 2 Other organizations and
officials
with
chartering
authority
include
charitable
organizations, city councils, city mayors, state boards of charter
schools, state commissioners of education and vocational school
districts. 10 3 Among the many benefits supporters of charter
schools point to are the following: charter schools promote
healthy competition to prompt the improvement of traditional
public schools; provide accountability, due to the lingering threat
of charter revocation in case the charter school fails to live up to
its charter agreement with the charter authorizer; and are a
laboratory for developing innovative educational ideas. 104
Charter schools share attributes of public schools in the sense
that they can get funding from the government; they cannot
charge tuition. 10 5 However, charter schools are also exempt from
certain state laws and regulation in exchange for a commitment
to live up to the educational mission and goals specified in the
98 See Krisbergh, supra note 96, at 1037 (observing "charter school laws differ among
states").
99 See Julie F. Mead & Preston C. Green, III, Keeping Promises:An Examination of
Charter Schools' Vulnerability to Claims for Educational Liability, 2001 BYU EDUC. &
L.J. 35, 46 (2001) (discussing that state statutes specify "under what circumstances a
charter school may be established" and "length of time a charter may be granted.").
100 See Kraft, supranote 97, at 2331 (explaining process of creating a charter school).
101 See Mead, supra note 8, at 353 (highlighting that most states give chartering
authority to state educational agency and school districts).
102 See Mead, supra note 8, at 379 (listing states that grant chartering authority to
colleges and universities).
103 See GREEN & MEAD, supra note 96, at 1-8 (mentioning that persons and entities
seeking to start charter schools should consult their charter school statutes for
information on specific and more detailed requirements because applicable chartering
authority might have requirements for granting charter in addition to those specified in
state statute); Mead, supra note 8,at 379 (cataloging organizations that have been given
"charter-granting authority").
104 See Mead, supra note 8,at 350 (highlighting benefits of charter schools described
by its supporters).
105 See Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District,
84 N.C. L. REV. 857, 881 (2006) (commenting that charter schools are public because they
"receive only public funds, and may not require tuition").
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charter; this exemption makes charter schools a semblance of
private schools.106
The NCLB seems to conflict with the concept of charter
schools, however, in the sense that the NCLB spells out
accountability standards that public schools, including charter
schools, must comply with, while the charter school concept
entails exempting charter schools from laws and regulations. 10 7
The NCLB allows state law to limit or exempt an LEA (local
educational agency; school district) from offering public school
choice under Title I only if such law explicitly forbids public
school choice by restricting public school assignments or student
transfer among public schools. 0 8 In addition, the NCLB takes
precedence over any local school board policies or local laws
limiting school choice under Title 1.109 However, "[plublic school
choice is a critical component of NCLB because it offers a student
enrolled in a Title I school that is in need of improvement an
opportunity to attend another school, even as his or her original
school is undergoing improvement."1 10 The reason underlying
this is the NCLB's recognition that "[t]he process of turning
around a low-performing school typically takes time, and during
that time that school's students are at risk of falling further
behind if they do not have additional options."11 1 Moreover, the
NCLB embraces the notion that "public school choice can
increase both equity and quality in education."112
The way the NCLB deals with charter schools depends on
whether the charter school is part of an LEA or its own LEA.113
State charter laws determine whether a charter school is a part
of an LEA or its own LEA.114

106 See id. at 882 (mentioning charter schools are exempt from regulations but school
must be accountable for terms of its charter).
107 See Robert J. Martin, Rigid Rules for Charter Schools: New Jersey as a Case
Study, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 439, 489 (2005) (stating "that congressional goal [of imposing
greater accountability on charter schools] was recently evidenced by several provisions of
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.").
108 See PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, at E-9 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 200.44).
109 See id. at E-10.
110 Id. at A-1.
111 Id.
112 Id.

113 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1479, 1791
(2002).
114 Id. at 1789.
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The NCLB requires states to develop academic achievement
standards and assess the adequate yearly progress (AYP) of
students toward those standards.115 School districts and public
schools, including charter schools receiving Title I funds must
report AYP data.11 6 Those schools and school districts not
making AYP could be required to offer options for students to
transfer to higher performing schools, provide supplemental
educational services (SES), take corrective action, or restructure
poor performing schools.11 7
An LEA must identify for School Improvement any school that
fails to make AYP for two consecutive years.118 When a school
has been identified for Improvement, the LEA must give all
students enrolled in that school the choice of transferring to
another public school that is a part of the LEA.119 Unless
prohibited under state law, the choice of schools for transfer may
include a charter school that has not been identified for School
Improvement.120 In making transfer decisions, the LEA shall
give priority to the lowest performing students from low-income
families. 121
If the school identified for School Improvement fails to make
AYP for two consecutive years, it must undergo Corrective
Action.12 2 Corrective Action entails a change in school staff or
curriculum and other actions designed to substantially address
the school's persistent failure to meet AYP and greatly increase
the likelihood that the students meet or exceed the proficient
levels of achievement on the state's assessment.1 2 3

115 Id. at 1458, 1487.
116 Id. at 1487.
117 Id. at 1484.
118 Id. at 1479.
119 Id. at
120 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 §1116(b)(1)(E)(i), 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i)
(2002) (stating that 'local educational agency shall.., provide all students enrolled in
the school with the option to transfer to another public school ...which may include a
public charter school, that has not been identified for school improvement under this
paragraph, unless such an option is prohibited by State law.").
121 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, supra note 120 at §1116(b)(1)(E)(ii) (noting
that "[iln providing students the option to transfer to another public school, the local
educational agency shall give priority to the lowest achieving children from low-income
families.").
122 See id. at § 1116(b)(7)(C) (setting a two-year period for making school
improvements).
123 See id. at § 1116(b)(7)(A) (describing situations warranting Corrective Action).
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If after one full school year of Corrective Action the school fails
2
to make AYP, the LEA shall restructure the school.1 4
Restructure of the school entails implementation, consistent with
state law, of one of the following governance strategies:
converting the school into a charter school; overhaul of the school
staff identified with the failure to meet AYP; or contracting with
a private management company to operate the school. 125
During Corrective Action or Restructuring, the LEA must
continue to avail students in the school the option of transferring
to other public schools, including charter schools, meeting
AYP.126 In making admission decisions, the LEA must take into
consideration parental preferences for schools, however the
decision as to which school a student will be admitted to is the
LEA's.127 Any school identified for School Improvement,
Corrective Action or Restructuring that meets AYP for two
consecutive years shall no longer be required to offer choice to
students to transfer out of the school. 128
As with schools, an LEA that fails to make AYP for two
consecutive years is to be identified for Improvement.129 If the
LEA fails to meet AYP for two consecutive years, the state shall
ensure the LEA takes Corrective Action, which is very similar to
the steps for restructuring schools, as described above. 13 0
The latest Non-Regulatory Guidance from the United States
Department of Education addressing the new requirements on
Charter Schools, issued in March 2003, suggests that a charter
school that is its own LEA and is identified for School
124 See id. at § 1116(b)(8)(A) (limiting duration of corrective action to one year).
125 See id. at § 1116(b)(8)(B) (describing alternative governance possibilities).
126 See id. at § 1116(b)(7)(C)(i), (8)(A)(i) (stating "local educational agency shall...
continue to provide all students enrolled in the school with the option to transfer to
another public school.").
127 See PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, at E-3 (noting that "[i]f more than one
school that meets the requirements.., the LEA must offer more than one choice to
eligible students... LEAs should strive to provide a full menu of choices to students and
parents, and must take into account parents' preferences among the choices offered.").
128 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, supra note 120 at § 1116(b)(12) (requiring
"[ilf
any school identified... makes adequate yearly progress for two consecutive school
years, the local educational agency shall no longer subject the school to the requirements
of school improvement, corrective action, or restructuring or identify the school for school
improvement for the succeeding school year.").
129 See id. at § 1116(c)(3) (stating that "[a] State shall identify for improvement any
local educational agency that, for 2 consecutive years ... failed to make adequate yearly
progress as defined in the State's plan").
130 See id. at § 1116(c)(10)(B)(ii) (setting two-year time limit for corrective action).
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Improvement, Corrective Action or Restructure is subject to the
Title I provisions applicable to schools, not those applicable to
LEAs.131

However, the distinction between a charter school that is part
of an LEA and that which is its own LEA should not be lost, as
this distinction is crucial in many respects to the way NCLB
treats charter schools.13 2 A charter school that is its own LEA is
a single-school LEA; therefore, when it comes to offering choice
options when that charter school is identified for School
Improvement, Corrective Action or Restructuring, a question
33
arises: what choice(s) should such a charter school provide?1
The Non-Regulatory Guidance states that a charter school that is
its own LEA must establish, to the extent practicable,
cooperative agreements with other LEAs in order to offer choices
for students choosing to transfer.134 The charter school
authorizer or the charter school must then notify parents of the
list of choices of schools for transferring students, which must
35
include the students' option to return to the charter school.1
If a charter school that is a part of an LEA is identified for
School Improvement, Corrective Action or Restructure, the LEA
may include any school within its jurisdiction, including charter
36
schools, on the list of choices for students seeking to transfer.1
Thus, when a charter school is a part of an LEA, the LEA may
131 See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE IMPACT OF THE NEW TITLE I REQUIREMENTS ON
CHARTER SCHOOLS, NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE, DRAFT, B-4 (2003), available at
http://www.nsba.org/site/docs/11400/11331.pdf (declaring that "[a] charter school that is
its own LEA and that is identified as in need of improvement is subject to the provisions
of Title I that apply to schools in need of improvement. This is the same policy that
applies to all single-school LEAs receiving Title I funds.").
132 Compare id. at B-5 (requiring charter schools that are part of an LEA to provide
students with choice options when classified as in need of improvement, corrective action
or restructuring) with id. at B-1 (2003) (stating that charter school that is its own LEA
does not need to provide choice options to its students when classified as in need of
improvement, corrective action or restructuring).
133 See id. at B-6 (2003) (addressing question of whether charter schools that are
their own LEAs must, under state law, provide choice options to other students when
charter school is identified as in need of improvement, corrective action or restructuring).
134 See id. (requiring this to avail choice in instances where "all public schools to
which a student may transfer within LEA (including charter school LEAs) are identified
for school improvement, corrective action, or restructuring.").
135 See id. (stating that where charter school is an LEA itself, authorizer or charter
school itself should notify parents of school's status and their options, including returning
children to their "home" public school).
136 See id. at B-5 (requiring charter schools that are part of LEAs to provide choice
options and transportation to students when LEA is identified by State as in need of
improvement, corrective action or restructuring).
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include that school on the list of choices offered to students
seeking to transfer, as long as that charter school is not identified
for Improvement, Corrective Action or Restructuring. 137 The LEA
is responsible for notifying parents of the list of choices of schools
for transferring students, including the option of returning to the
charter school.138 If all the schools, including charter schools,
within the LEA's jurisdiction are identified for Improvement,
Corrective Action or Restructure, 34 C.F.R. Section 200.44(h) as
well as the Non-Regulatory Guidance state that to the extent
practicable, the LEA is required to enter into cooperative
agreements with one or more LEAs in the area. 139 Where a
charter school that is its owni LEA is located within a larger LEA,
the Non-Regulatory Guidance encourages the larger LEA with
school(s) identified for Improvement, Corrective Action or
Restructuring to enter into cooperative agreements with such
charter school so as to be able to offer the charter school as an
option for its students. 14 0
Many states require charter schools to admit students on a
first-come first-serve basis. 14 1 However, when oversubscribed,
most states mandate that the charter school admit students on
the basis of a lottery system. 14 2 To be eligible for funds under the
United States Department of Education's Charter School
Program (CSP, a federal grant program for charter schools) when
oversubscribed, charter schools must admit students using a
lottery system. 14 3 Requiring admission on the basis of lottery
137 See id. at B-1 (stating that LEAs should list charter schools that have not been
identified for improvement, correction action or restructuring on list of schools to which
students may transfer).
138 See THE IMPACT OF THE NEW TITLE I REQUIREMENTS, supra note 131, at B-4
(demanding that parents be notified of option to transfer their children to other schools,
including child's "home" public school, if charter school is identified as in need of
improvement, corrective action or restructuring).
139 See id. at B-6 (stating that charter school must, if practicable, establish
cooperative agreements with other LEAs in area).
140 See id. at B-2 (requiring charter school that is its own LEA but falls into
boundaries of larger LEA to work with charter school LEAs within its geographic
boundaries to reach agreements allowing its students to transfer to these schools).
141 See, e.g., New Hampshire's Public Charter Schools: A Look at the Successes and
Challenges That Lie Ahead (N.H. Dep't of Educ.) at http://www.ed.state.nh.us/education
News/charter.htm (detailing how New Hampshire charter schools admit applicants on
first-come, first-serve basis).
142 See GREEN & MEAD, supra note 96, at 111 (noting that charter schools generally
use lotteries if more students apply for admission than can be admitted).
143 See THE IMPACT OF THE NEW TITLE I REQUIREMENTS, supra note 131, at B-3
(stating that in order to be an eligible charter school under Federal charter school grants
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could present a challenge to the NCLB's school choice paradigm.
Recall, the NCLB requires that schools identified for School
Improvement, Corrective Action or Restructuring offer choices for
students seeking to transfer to high performing schools.14 4 If a
charter school eligible to receive such students is oversubscribed
and has to admit students on a lottery system, is that charter
school really a "choice" for students seeking transfer, keeping in
mind that since a lottery system is a random selection system,
there is no guarantee that any student from a school failing AYP
will be among those chosen through the lottery? The Public
School Choice Non-Regulatory Guidance permits charter schools
to adjust their lottery system to ensure students seeking to
45
transfer get priority in admission. 1
The federal regulations implementing the NCLB prohibit an
LEA from using a lack of physical capacity to deny students the
choice to transfer.146 However, the LEA is permitted to take this
lack of capacity into account, in determining which schools to list
as options for students seeking to transfer. 14 7 For a charter
school that is part of an LEA, this means that an oversubscribed
8
charter school need not be offered as an option for students.14
The Public School Choice Guidance states that LEAs lacking
capacity to accommodate all students seeking to transfer must
take creative steps, such as encouraging the formation of new
1 49
charter schools, to accommodate such students.
The NCLB provides that where public schools within an LEA's
jurisdiction fail to meet AYP for three consecutive years or more,
the LEA must offer Supplemental Educational Services (SES) to

program, charter school must use lottery to admit students if there are more applicants
than openings).
144 See PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, A-2 (explaining that LEAs receiving
funds under Title I must make choice available to all students in qualifying schools).
145 See id. at E-5 (allowing charter schools to weight lottery in favor of covered
students and to still remain compliant with CSP requirements).
146 See 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(d) (announcing "[a]n LEA may not use lack of capacity to
deny students the option to transfer").
147 See PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, at E-7 (explaining that lack of capacity
cannot be used as excuse outright, but rather only factor taken into consideration in
providing choice options).
148 See id. (providing that every student wishing to transfer must have opportunity,
and if school in an LEA is oversubscribed, then that LEA must either create additional
capacity or provide choices of other schools).
149 See id. at E-8 (explaining how LEAs can create additional capacity).
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students from low-income families.150 The LEA is required to
offer SES as well in the cases of charter schools that are part of
that LEA, pursuant to NCLB, Title I Section 1116(e)(1).151 A
charter school that is its own LEA must itself provide students
with SES.152 SES includes tutoring as well as other services,
supplementing the school day instruction, that are designed to
enrich the academic achievement of students from poor
performing school.1 53
II. POLICY PROBLEMS
A. Choice under NCLB and Desegregation
Over the years, critics of charter schools have voiced concerns
that charter schools may provide white students and parents
with the opportunity to escape desegregation, perpetuating onerace schools.154 In fact, in line with the theme of choice
underlying charter schools, "[m]any families have exercised their
power of choice by attending charter schools that are
disproportionately
one-race," 15 5
thus
"circumventing
desegregation decrees."156
Many school districts are
still under court-ordered
desegregation decrees.157 These decrees are designed to ensure
150 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 supra note 120, at § 1116(e)(1) (declaring
that any LEA not meeting the AYP requirments must "arrange for the provision of
supplementary educational services to eligible children in the school").
151 See THE IMPACT OF THE NEW TITLE I REQUIREMENTS, supra note 131, at C-2 (2003)
(imposing requirement on charter schools in addition to other public schools).
152 See id. at C-3 (stating that "[a] charter school that is its own LEA must pay for
such services on the same basis as any other LEA.").
153 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, supra note 120 at § 1116(e)(12)(C)
(describing what supplementary educational services entails).
154 See GREEN & MEAD, supra note 96, at 7 (noting how this may subject charter
school movement to litigation); Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race and Charter
Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563, 569 (2001) (stating that "[s]ome charter schools are
integrated, but many others are deeply segregated.").
155 GREEN & MEAD, supranote 96, at 7.
156 Id. at 101; see Stephen Eisdorfer, Racial Ceilings and School Choice: Public
School Choice and Racial Integration, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 943-44 (1993) (noting
practical effect of public school choice proposals is to desegregate schools in North and
West and resegregate schools in South because both white and minority parents are very
reluctant to send their children to schools of predominantly opposite race).
157 See GREEN & MEAD, supra note 96, at 114 (detailing decrees and burdens they
impose on schools); see also Nick Lewin, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: The
Triumph of School Choice over Racial Desegregation, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY
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that school districts eliminate vestiges of past segregation with
respect to the Green factors: student assignments, faculty
assignments, transportation, facilities, student activities and
education quality.15 8 Charter schools that are part of an LEA
must comply with the desegregation decree applicable to the
LEA.159 Fears that charter schools might fuel segregation
through the development and propagation of one-race schools
may be one reason thirteen states - Arizona, Colorado, Delaware,
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Virginia - mandate by
statute that charter schools comply with desegregation
decrees.1 60 Thus, even charter schools that are their own LEA
might be required to comply with desegregation decrees.161
As with the theme of choice underlying the notion of charter
schools, the theme of choice underlying the NCLB162 has led to
fears that one-race charters will be perpetuated.163 If a great
number of students of one-race opt to transfer from schools
identified for School Improvement, Corrective Action or
Restructuring, that could leave the poor performing school
164
(charter or other school) in violation of a desegregation decree.
In addition, students opting to transfer to schools composed of
student populations that are of their own race, could leave the
95, 112 (2005) (highlighting conflict facing school districts subject to both school choice
provisions of NCLB and court-ordered desegregation decrees).
158 See GREEN & MEAD, supra note 96, at 114 (explaining how schools under decrees
must operate); See also Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 435
(1968) (examining how segregation affected schools in "every facet of school operationsfaculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities.").
159 See Parker, supra note 154, at 617 (discussing "[i]f that school district or state
board of education is subject to a school desegregation order, its actions vis-a-vis the
charter school petition must be consistent with the school desegregation duty.").
160 See GREEN & MEAD, supra note 96, at 114 (noting prohibitions in state statutes
against maintaining segregative policies).
161 See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., APPLYING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS TO PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOLS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 8, 22 n. 10 (2000),
availableat http://www.uscharterschools.org/pdf/fr/civil rights.pdf (explaining potential
effect of charter school that is its own LEA on desegregation plan).
162 See PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, A-2 (2004) (noting that "public school
choice can increase both equity and quality in education.").
163 See Dan J. Nichols, Brown v. Board of Education and the No Child Left Behind
Act: Competing Ideologies, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 151, 172 (2005) (explaining high-stakes
accountability under NCLB, rather than racial integration, as conservative movement's
answer to underachievement of minority students).
164 See Parker, supra note 154, at 618 (noting existence of charter school in district
under desegregation decree could have effect of increasing segregation in traditional
public school formerly attended by transferring students, as well as lead to an exodus of
faculty and staff from public schools to charter schools).

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 22:1

receiving school(s) in violation of a desegregation decree, if the
school is not already violating the decree.1 6 5 Thus, the NCLB
could foster charter school violations of desegregation decrees.
The question arises: Do charter schools have to comply with
desegregation decrees if it would put them in violation of the
"choice" mandates of the NCLB? The federal regulations
implementing the NCLB state that an LEA subject to a
desegregation plan that is voluntary or court-ordered is not
exempt from the NCLB public school requirements.1 6 6 However,
the LEA is permitted to factor in the desegregation decree in
deciding how it would offer choices to students. 16 7 Thus, the LEA
might have the option of not including a charter school that is a
part of the LEA in the list of choices available, if enrolling
students in that school would put the school in violation of a
desegregation decree, as long as the LEA does make other choices
available to the students.16 8 Moreover, should the LEA choose to
include such charter school in the list of choices offered to
students seeking to transfer, the LEA might be able to allocate
students among the options in a manner that ensures that the
charter school is not in violation of the desegregation decree.1 6 9
The Public School Choice Guidance states:
An LEA that is operating under a court-ordered
[desegregation] plan should first determine whether it is able
to offer choice within the parameters of its plan. If it is not
able to do so, the LEA needs to seek court approval for
amendments to the plan that permit a transfer option for
students enrolled in schools identified
for school
improvement, corrective action or restructuring. If the LEA
is unable to secure changes to the plan that permit a transfer
option, the LEA will be out of compliance with Title I. If that
165 See Trisha Loscalzo Yates, A Criticism of the No Child Left Behind Act: How the
Convention on the Rights of the Child Can Offer Promising Reform of Education
Legislation in America, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 399, 421 (2006) (stating
further that school choice is disruptive to both transferring students and their peers at
receiving schools and serves to overcrowd and reduce status of receiving school).
166 See 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(c)(1) (stating that desegregation plans do not affect
requirements of schools identified for school improvement, corrective action, or
restructuring by statute).
167 See id. at (c)(2) (requiring the LEA to take into account desegregation plan).
168 See id. (requiring transfer option but allowing LEA to consider desegregation plan
in determining "how" to provide it).
169 See id. at (c)(3) (leaving flexibility to LEA in establishing transfer option that
meets both 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(a)(1) and desegregation plan).
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occurs, it should notify the [State Educational Agency] SEA
and this Department of its request to the court and of the
court's decision [34 C.F.R. Section 200.44(c)(3)].
If the plan has been agreed to with the Department's Office
of Civil Rights (OCR), OCR will work with the LEA to
identify permissible Amendments to the plan that will
enable the LEA to comply with Title I public school choice
requirements. 170
As a single-charter -school LEA, a charter school that is its own
LEA and is subject to a desegregation decree has no other schools
under its auspices, distinguishing it from multi-school LEAs.171
The charter school is required to offer choices to students seeking
to transfer but likely has no control or stake in whether the
receiving schools are put in violation of a desegregation decree as
a result of the transfer.172
What should a charter school identified for School
Improvement, Corrective Action or Restructuring do when, in
complying with the NCLB's choice provision that forces the
charter school to let students transfer to high performing schools,
the transferring students are mostly of one race, resulting in a
situation where the charter school violates a desegregation
decree? Where the charter school is a part of an LEA, the LEA or
the charter school must seek a court order modifying the decree if
complying with the decree would forbid the transfer of
students.17 3 Where the charter school is its own LEA, then it
must seek modification of the decree if compliance with the
decree would prevent the school from compliance with the
NCLB.174

170 See PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, at G-3.
171 See id. at G-1-G-4 (discussing charter schools operating as LEAs).
172 See 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(C)(1) (stating that when LEA is subject to desegregation
decree whether or not "that plan is voluntary, court-ordered, or required by a Federal or
State administrative agency, the LEA is not exempt" from offering the option to transfer
to students).
173 See 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(C)(3) (declaring that if "desegregation plan forbids the LEA
from offering the transfer option required ... LEA must secure appropriate changes to
the plan to permit compliance"); See PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, G-1-G-4
(discussing compliance with desegregation plans).
174 See 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(C)(3) (applying rule to charter school that operates as its
own LEA); PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, at G-1-G-4.
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Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,175 a United States
Supreme Court decision, suggests that federal courts could
modify desegregation decrees if certain conditions are met. 176 In
Rufo, a consent decree between county officials and prison
inmates required the construction of a new jail to provide pretrial
detainees single occupancy cells. 17 7 Work toward the jail's
construction was delayed; meanwhile the inmate population
outgrew projections.178 The sheriff moved to modify the decree so
as to permit double bunking in certain cells.179 The federal
district court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the
sheriffs motion. 180 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment
and remanded the case for the district court to apply the
standard it set forth. 181 This standard requires parties seeking to
modify a consent decree to establish that a significant change in
circumstances justifies the modification.18 2 The modification may
be justified when (1) a change in facts makes compliance with the
decree substantially more difficult; (2) the decree is unworkable
due to unforeseen obstacles; or (3) enforcing the decree without
modifying it would be detrimental to the public interest.1 8 3 Once
the movant satisfies this standard, the district court must assess
the proposed modification to ensure that it is suitably tailored to

175 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
176 Id. at 368-69 (permitting modification in event of change in factual circumstances
and requiring it when necessary to conform to change in federal law).
177 Id. at 367 (arising from court decree declaring that conditions at jail were
constitutionally deficient).
178 Id. (explaining overcrowding).
179 Id. (detailing sheriffs goal of increasing jail capacity).
180 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1992)
(describing reasons court denied motion).
181 See id. at 372 (stating that lower courts applied wrong standard in denying
motion).
182 See id. at 383 (explaining that "party seeking modification of a consent decree
bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstance warrants
revision of the decree.").
183 See id. at 384 (highlighting fact that "[m]odification of a consent decree may be
warranted when changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree
substantially more onerous" and continuing to state that "when a decree proves to be
unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles, or when enforcement of the decree without
modification would be detrimental to the public interest"); see also GREEN & MEAD, supra
note 96, at 116 (outlining that "modification may be warranted when (1) changed factual
conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous; (2) the decree
proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles; or (3) enforcement of the decree
without modification would be detrimental to the public interest.").
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deal with the changed circumstances.184 In line with this, the
district court must ensure (1) the modification would not create
or perpetuate a constitutional violation; (2) the modification
would resolve the problems created by the changed
circumstances; and (3) the court defers to local administrators,
charged with the responsibility of evaluating and solving
problems of prison reform, to work out the details of the
implementation of a decree modification.185 A charter school or
applicant seeking to modify a desegregation decree pursuant to
Rufo would have to satisfy the standard and requirements set
6
forth above. 18
To prevent charter schools from perpetuating segregation,
another strategy a number of states have resorted to is the
enactment of racial balancing statutes.1 8 7 These statutes are of
various forms. California, Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, Wisconsin
and Wyoming merely require charter schools to adopt policies
that will ensure that the student population reflects the racial
composition of the surrounding school district. 18 8 Kansas,
Minnesota, and North Carolina, on the other hand, mandate
charter schools to ensure that the student population reflects the
racial composition of the surrounding school districts.18 9 Nevada
requires charter schools to ensure that their student population
falls within 10% of the racial composition of the surrounding
school district. 190 Penalties states impose for the failure of the
charter schools to comply with the racial balancing provisions
range from the denial of a charter to revocation of a granted
charter or school closure. 19 1
184 See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391 (stating that "if the moving party meets this standard,
the court should consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the
changed circumstance.").
185 See id. at 391-92 (discussing constraints in striving to rewrite consent decree).
186 See id. at 393 (concluding that under flexible standards adopted in this case,
"party seeking modification of a consent decree must establish that a significant change in
facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is suitably
tailored to the changed circumstance.").
187 See GREEN & MEAD, supra note 96, at 102 (stating "[r]acial balancing provisions
are one strategy employed by enabling statutes to prevent charter schools from becoming
racially segregated.").
188 See GREEN & MEAD, supra note 96, at 103 (listing California, Florida, New Jersey,
Ohio, Wisconsin, and Wyoming policies).
189 See id. (explaining Kansas, Minnesota, and North Carolina provisions).
190 See id. (specifying Nevada provision).
191 See Gajendragadkar, supra note 9, at 155-58 (discussing state racial balancing
statutes).
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Legal questions arise as to whether racial balancing provisions
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. When a racial balancing provision is challenged as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the court has to
determine what level of scrutiny to apply.192 The three different
levels of scrutiny a court can apply are: strict scrutiny,
heightened scrutiny, and rational basis scrutiny. Strict scrutiny,
the highest level of scrutiny, is applied when: (a) the government
uses a classification that is suspect, for example, race; or (b) the
government classification entails a fundamental right protected
under the United States Constitution, such as the right of
interstate travel and the right to vote. 193 To overcome strict
scrutiny, the government must show that the classification is
narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling government interest.194
In order to overcome heightened scrutiny, the government must
show that the classification used is substantially related to an
important government interest.195 Courts most often apply
heightened scrutiny to government classifications based on
gender.19 6 Rational basis scrutiny, the easiest level of scrutiny to
satisfy, merely requires the government to demonstrate that the
government interest is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest. 19 7
A racial balancing provision that mandates charter schools to
account for race in admission decisions would be subject to strict

192 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (creating
new level of scrutiny to examines notion that stricter judicial standards should exist for
legislation facially within "specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments which are ... embraced within the Fourteenth.").
193 See Robert F. Bodi, Democracy at Work: The Sixth Circuit Upholds the Right of the
People of Cincinnati to Choose Their Own Morality in Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati,Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), 32 AKRON L. REV. 667,
671-73 (1999) (discussing three levels of judicial scrutiny).
194 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (stating "[wihen race-based
action is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring
requirement is also satisfied.").
195 See id. at 309 (extrapolating that "Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to all
racial classifications to smoke out illegitimate uses of race, by assuring that the
government is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.")
196 See e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 574 (1995) (applying heightened
scrutiny to Military Institute's exclusionary policy denying women admission).
197 See e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(declaring "general rule ... legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
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scrutiny if challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.198
Provisions that require charter schools ensure their student
population reflects the racial composition of the surrounding
school district are such an example.19 9 Those provisions that
merely require charter schools adopt policies to ensure that the
student population reflects the racial composition of the
surrounding school district might not be analyzed under strict
scrutiny in an Equal Protection Clause challenge, as such
provisions merely require charter schools employ strategies, like
outreach and advertising, to increase their pool of minority
applicants. 2 00 In states requiring such policies, race is not
required as a factor in making the decision as to which students
to admit. 2 0 1 "[M]ethods designed to avoid disparate impact are
permissible when race-neutral selection occurs." 2 02
The leading case on Equal Protection Clause challenges to
racial balancing provisions is Beaufort County Board of
Education v. Lighthouse Charter School Committee.20 3 In that
case, applying strict scrutiny, the trial court found that the racial
balancing provision in question violated the Equal Protection
Clause because the provision was not narrowly tailored and
failed to satisfy a compelling government interest. 204 That case
involved the Beaufort County Board of Education's denial of a
charter school application for failure to identify the students the
school would enroll, thereby making it difficult for the board to
decide whether the school would comply with South Carolina's
balancing provision. 20 5 Ruling that a charter school application
could be denied for failure to satisfy the racial balancing
provision, which in this case required that a charter school's
198 See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 808-09 (1998) (holding that Boston Latin
School's use of racial balancing in admission policy violated Equal Protection Clause
because it was not narrowly tailored).
199 See e.g., Beaufort County Bd. of Educ. v. Lighthouse Charter Sch. Comm., 335
S.C. 230, 233, 516 S.E.2d 655, 656 (1999) (reviewing challenge to South Carolina law
requiring that charter school enrollment not deviate more than 10% from surrounding
area of school district).
200 Id. at 238 (remanding to determine whether school raised enough funds).
201 Id.
202 Parker, supra note 154, at 592.
203 No. 97-CP-7-794 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pleas May 8, 2000).
204 See id.
205 See Beaufort, 516 S.E.2d 655 at 656, 659 (stating that Beaufort Board found that
Lighthouse's application failed to meet several requirements of Act and therefore was
denied).
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student population not differ from the school district's racial
composition by greater than 10%, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina remanded the case to the trial court to determine
whether the racial balancing nonetheless violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 20 6 Applying strict scrutiny, the trial court held
that the balancing provision violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it was an admissions policy that employed a
classification based on race. 207 The court rejected the board's
argument that the provision had a compelling interest of
increasing student diversity in charter schools. 20 8 The court
disagreed with United States Supreme Court Justice Powell's
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,209
that to ensure the educational benefit of diversity, universities
had a compelling interest in taking race into account in making
admission decisions. 2 10 Assuming arguendo that diversity was a
compelling interest, the trial court in Beaufort held that the
balancing provision was nonetheless unconstitutional, as it was
not narrowly tailored to satisfy the compelling interest. 2 11 In
deciding whether the racial classification was in fact narrowly
tailored, the trial court applied the five-factor test the United
States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit set out in Tuttle v.
Arlington County Sch. Board as:
(1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral policies, (2) the
planned duration of the policy, (3) the relationship
between the numerical goal and the percentage of minority
group members in the relevant population or work force,
(4) the flexibility of the policy, including the provision of
waivers if the goal cannot be met, and (5) the burden of the
policy on innocent third parties. 2 12

206 See id. at 659 (specifying that the constitutionality of such provision concerning
racial composition must be determined on remand).
207 See Beaufort, 97-CP-7-794.
208 See id.
209 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
210 See id. at 320 (finding that state has "substantial interest that legitimately may
be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive
consideration of race and ethnic origin").
211 Beaufort, 97-CP-7-794.
212 Id. slip op. at 4 (outlining five factor test (quoting Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch.
Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 1999))).
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Applying the first factor, the court had no knowledge of the
efficacy of race-neutral alternatives. 2 13 The court held that the
balancing provision did not satisfy the second factor because the
racial composition had to be complied with in perpetuity. 2 14 With
respect to the third factor, the court found that there was no
relationship between the provision's numerical goal and the
percentage of minorities in the charter school's pool of
students. 2 15 Applying the fourth factor, the court held that the
provision was inflexible, as it would compel charter schools to
recruit students as far as fifty or more miles away, and to require
students to travel such distances to school every day would result
in excessive transportation costs. 2 16 The court held that these
transportation burdens were not in tandem with the goal of
diversity. 21 7 Finding that the racial classifications and the
transportation costs were burdensome to innocent third parties,
the court held that the provision failed to satisfy the fifth
factor. 2 18 Concluding that the provision could not be severed from
the charter school statute, the court declared the entire statute
unconstitutional. 2 19 South Carolina's Attorney General and the
charter school appealed the trial court's ruling on the provision's
severability to the Supreme Court of South Carolina; the board
cross-appealed the court's ruling that the provision was
unconstitutional. 220 The state's legislature amended the charter
school statute while the appeal was pending, adding a
severability clause, and later changing the racial composition
requirement. 22 1 As a result, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina dismissed the appeal as moot. 22 2 The statute now
requires that the racial composition of the student population of
charter schools differ by not more than 20% from that of the
213 See id.
214 See id.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See id.
220 See County Bd. of Educ. v. Lighthouse Charter Sch. Comm., 353 S.C. 24, 27 (2003)
(providing background information).
221 See id.
222 Id. at 29 (stating "[b]ecause the original provision under which this case was
brought is no longer applicable and the new requirements. . . are substantially different,
we vacate the order of the circuit court and dismiss this appeal as moot.").
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school district the charter school seeks to serve. 2 2 3 The statute
also states that should the racial composition of the applicant's or
charter school's differ from the school district's by more than
20%, the school district must take into account the racial
composition of the applicant pool as well as the applicant's or
charter school's recruitment efforts in making a determination as
to whether the charter
school is discriminatory
or
nondiscriminatory. 2 24
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger,22 5 is unlikely to change the trial court's finding in
Beaufort, since the trial court rejected Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke which formed the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in
Grutter.22 6 In Grutter, the Court held that the University of
Michigan's admissions policy which used race as a "plus" factor
in admission decision was not violative of the Equal Protection
Clause, since race was only one of several factors the school
considered in admission decisions. 2 2 7 Other factors include
letters of recommendation, personal statement, undergraduate
grade point average, the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT)
score, essay on how the applicant intends to contribute to the
school's diversity and "soft variables" such as the enthusiasm of
the recommenders and the difficulty level of the undergraduate
courses the applicant took. 22 8 The Court agreed with the law
school's arguments that the enrollment of a "critical mass" of
underrepresented groups would serve an educational benefit and
ensure that members of such groups have the ability to
contribute to the legal profession. 2 2 9 The Court held that using
race as a "plus" factor differs from a quota system. 23 0
Furthermore, the Court stated that narrow tailoring does not
223 S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-50(B)(7) (2003) (reflecting new percentage requirement).
224 S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-70(D) (2003) (stating that if racial composition falls
beyond 20% threshold new considerations must be made).
225 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
226 See id. at 363 (noting that "only source for the Court's conclusion that public
universities are entitled to deference even within the confines of strict scrutiny is Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke.").
227 Id. at 343 (describing how the Equal Protection Clause is not violated in such
instances).
228 Id. at 315 (listing the admissions decision criteria).
229 Id. at 316 (stating that by allowing the Law School to enroll minority applicants it
can ensure unique contributions to the school atmosphere).
230 See id. at 334 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315
(1978)).

2007]

CHARTER SCHOOLS UNDER THE NCLB

require the law school to exhaust all conceivable race-neutral
alternatives before employing a race-conscious admission
policy. 23 1 The Court found that the law school's policy was
limited in duration and not significantly burdensome to innocent
third parties. 232
It is possible that other state and federal courts might find
racial balancing provisions requiring charter schools to take race
into account in admission decisions to satisfy compelling
interests not considered in Beaufort: preparing students to live
and work in a multicultural society; and the elimination of the
233
effects and vestiges of de facto segregation.
Charter schools in states with racial balancing provisions
might be faced with a situation where compliance with the
balancing provision would prevent the school from complying
with the NCLB's public school choice requirements or compliance
with the NCLB would put the school in violation of the state's
racial balancing provision. 23 4 What is the charter school to do
under such circumstances? The Public School Choice Guidance
does not explicitly address the conflict between the NCLB and
racial balancing provisions. 23 5 It seems the best answer available
from the federal regulations as well as the Public School Choice
Guidance is as follows: 34 C.F.R. Section 200.44(a)(5) and (b), as
well as the Public School Choice Guidance suggest that the only
state law an LEA can invoke to avoid complying with the NCLB's
public school choice requirements is a state law that "prohibits
choice through restrictions on public school assignments or the
transfer of students from one public school to another public
231 Id. at 309.
232 Id. at 341-43 (noting that Court was "satisfied that the Law School's admissions
program" did not unduly burden others and that it would end use of race as factor as soon
as possible).
233 See id. at 330 (noting that racially balanced schools are seen as preparing
students to work in "an increasingly diverse workforce and society."); see also Julie F.
Mead, Conscious Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to EducationalEnds in Elementary
and Secondary Education: A Legal Argument Derived from Recent Judicial Opinions, 8
MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 63, 64 (2002) (stating that many schools have used race in
determining student admissions to eliminate problems of segregation).
234 See Benjamin Michael Superfine, Using the Courts to Influence the
Implementation of No Child Left Behind, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 802 (2006)
(highlighting one potential conflict between following NCLB's public school choice
requirement and court order); see also Mead, supra note 233, at 130 n. 363 (noting that
charter schools must comply with Charter Schools Expansion Act, which mandates use of
random lottery in order to receive federal funds).
235 See PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, at E-9-10 (discussing state law conflict
with NCLB, but not directly discussing racial balancing provisions).
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school." 23 6 A charter school faced with a conflict between
compliance with the NCLB and the state's racial balancing
provision might argue that the balancing provision forbids choice
through restrictions on transfers that would lead to racial
imbalance in student population.
That might be a tough
argument to win however, since a counter argument could just as
well be made that the balancing provisions do not explicitly
prohibit transfers between public schools. 23 7 The Public School
Choice Guidance states: "Other laws, such as those that mandate
specific student-teacher ratios, may make providing choice
options more difficult, but may not be used to prohibit parental
choices." 2 38 This suggests that "other laws," for example, state
laws other than those forbidding choice through restricting public
school assignments or student transfers between public schools
(including charter schools), can only make the provision of choice
options more difficult; not prohibit choices under the NCLB.239
As with the filing of a motion with a court to modify a
desegregation decree, discussed above, the charter school could
lobby the state legislature to amend the statute or challenge the
balancing provision in court, making federalism arguments or
arguments under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.
CONCLUSION

As this paper indicates, among its many noble goals, the NCLB
seeks to close academic achievement gaps between minority and
nonminority students by "mandating" choice and giving students
the opportunity to transfer from poor performing schools to high
performing schools. Charter schools also have an underlying goal
of providing the choice of better quality education to students in
a school that has many of the same features of a private school,
such as exemption from many state laws and regulations, while
at the same time receiving government funds. Over the years, in
236 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(b); see PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, at E-9 (examining
the conflict of law).
237 See PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 4, at E-9 (noting other state laws
existence, but suggesting they may not be used to prohibit choice).
238 Id.
239 See id. (stating that although some state laws may make providing choice to
parents or students more difficult, they do not always prohibit).
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a bid to ensure educational equity and improve the educational
performance of minority students, civil rights advocates and
others have employed three paradigms: the desegregation
paradigms; school finance paradigm; and choice paradigm. As
discussed above, charter schools fall under the choice paradigm.
The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 2003
pilot study, however, reveals that charter school students do not
necessarily perform better than students in public schools. 240 For
example, the study found that fourth-grade charter school
students did not perform as well as their counterparts in public
school. 24 1 The study found no measurable differences in the
mathematics and reading performances between fourth-grade
charter school students and students of similar races in other
public schools. 2 42 Thus, it is not clear whether charter schools
actually improve educational performance. More studies would
need to be done before that question is settled.

240 See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, AMERICA'S CHARTER
SCHOOLS: RESULTS FROM THE NAEP 2003 PILOT STUDY, 1 (2004), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/studies/charter/2005456.asp (noting lack of expected
difference between performance of students in charter schools compared to students in
public schools).
241 Id. (describing research results).
242 Id. (analyzing study conducted on performance of White, Black and Hispanic
students).

